War, Collaboration, and Endogenous Ethnic Polarization:

The Path to Ethnic Cleansing¹

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To what extent does the depth of ethnic cleavages play a role in the process that leads to ethnic cleansing? The question is important, as the conventional explanation for ethnic cleansing takes deep ethnic cleavages as the main exogenous variable that explains this phenomenon.\textsuperscript{1} The idea is that in societies where ethnic cleavages are deep, relations between different ethnic groups are more strained, and issues that have to do with ethnicity dominate over other politically relevant questions. This leads to the emergence of “organic” nationalism, which views ethnic minorities as inherently different and deserving of exclusion, rather than “civic” nationalism, which aims to incorporate ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{2} In contexts where organic nationalism predominates, ethnic cleansing follows whenever events such as state collapse, war, or geopolitical instability eliminate the constraints against this policy.

This chapter argues that relations between ethnic groups and organic nationalism are to a large extent functions of relations between states rather than of deep ethnic cleavages. In particular, interethnic relations deteriorate and ethnic cleavages trump other cleavages when competing sides in an interstate conflict ally themselves with different ethnic groups in a given society. Such a situation typically emerges when states form alliances with the minority groups in their rival’s territory and use these alliances to control the rest of the population during wars and occupations. This situation not only poisons the relations between ethnic groups and radicalizes the politicians that represent the majority ethnic group, but also puts the issue of minority treatment on top of the political agenda once the occupation or war is over. According to this argument, polarized relations between ethnic groups and organic nationalism are not permanent traits that characterize societies with deep ethnic divisions, but variables endogenous to
interstate interactions. Put differently, tense relations between ethnic groups are proximate rather than structural or exogenous causes of ethnic cleansing.

To develop this argument, the chapter studies the evolution of the relationship between the majority and minority ethnic groups in the following cases: the Germans in inter-war Czechoslovakia and the Greeks in Ottoman Turkey. These cases were selected for two reasons. First, in both cases the differences between minority and majority groups were historically quite deep. Hence, these are precisely the kind of contexts in which one would expect to observe polarized interethnic relations and organic nationalism as exogenous conditions. Second, the cases cover different historical backgrounds: the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the case of the Germans in Czechoslovakia, and the Ottoman Empire in the case of the Greeks in Ottoman Turkey. Thus, the conclusions do not depend on a specific historical experience associated with the policies of a single empire.

The chapter has three parts. First, I outline the observable implications of the argument. Second, I present the case studies. Finally, I summarize and discuss the findings of the chapter.

**The Argument and Observable Implications**

What types of observations would support the contention that interethnic relations and ethnic cleansing are endogenous to interstate relations? The logic of the argument suggests that during times of peace, ethnic cleavages do not trump non-ethnic ones and the politicians representing the majority ethnic groups prefer inclusionary policies rather than ethnic cleansing. Once the minority group is allied with a rival during a war, ethnic cleavages gain relative importance and majority politicians turn to more hostile policies.
A number of observable implications follow. To start with, even in societies with deep ethnic cleavages, non-ethnic political divisions, such as those between social classes or center and periphery, should frequently take precedence over ethnicity. To see if this is the case, one needs to focus on the political organization of minority and majority ethnic groups and the relations between them. If ethnic groups are represented by several competing political parties that reflect class or other non-ethnic cleavages and these parties cooperate with each other across ethnic divisions, this would support the argument that ethnicity is not the main cleavage in a given society.

The argument also has implications for the policies that majority politicians follow vis-à-vis ethnic minorities. At the very least, in the absence of alliances between outside states and minority groups, majority political leaders should follow inclusive policies such as assimilating the minority or providing autonomy. These politicians should then become more antagonistic toward minorities when an outside state forms wartime alliances with the minorities.

The potential problem with these implications is that the policies that majority politicians follow during times of peace might not reflect their true preferences. Majority politicians might be avoiding ethnic cleansing because of constraints, such as lack of a location to which minorities could be deported. Given this constraint, they might be using other policies such as forced assimilation to pressure the minority group to leave of its own accord.

There are two solutions to this problem. First, one can ask what type of policy is clearly not a substitute for ethnic cleansing in a given context. For example, if the majority politicians spend resources on policies that are aimed at improving the cultural
rights or economic conditions of a given ethnic group, this would suggest that their main preference is not permanent exclusion of the group from the territory of the state. Similarly, if majority politicians encourage immigration by the members of the minority group from outside the state, one can also assume that they do not desire to use ethnic cleansing. Second, one can also ask whether majority politicians within or across political parties disagree with each other on how to treat minority ethnic groups. Majority politicians who advocate more pro-minority policies are not more likely to hide their true intentions than politicians who advocate ethnic cleansing or repressive policies that might be designed to substitute for ethnic cleansing. Hence it is reasonable to assume that the politicians who oppose ethnic cleansing or potential substitutes for it are genuinely more favorable toward inclusionary policies. This argument would gain particular support if those politicians who consistently support inclusionary policies during times of peace change their minds after a war-time alliance between the minority group and an occupying state.

Finally, the argument also has implications for the formation of alliances between outside states and minority groups. I argue that ethnic polarization and ethnic cleansing are outcomes of international factors, rather than of deep ethnic divisions. Hence, the argument also implies that the willingness of minority groups to form an alliance with an outside state is primarily exogenous to ethnic divisions between the minority and majority groups.

There are basically two ways in which these alliances can be formed. The first possibility is that in contexts where the differences between majority and minority groups run deep, the minority leadership is a coherent group of individuals who favor
independence or joining another state and who are ready to enter into alliances with expansionist states to achieve these ends. If this is how ethnic differences influence alliance formation between minorities and outside states, then ethnic differences do play an important, though indirect, role in the process that leads to ethnic cleansing.

The second possibility starts from the premise that the minority leadership is composed of a variety of types with different preferences on whether to collaborate with outside states or not. In this context, the outside state can play a crucial role by selecting out those minority leaders that favor collaboration while undermining those that oppose it. During peacetime, the outside state can achieve this end by providing financial assistance or strategic aid to those factions that are sympathetic to its goals. During occupations, the outside state might use more direct means, such as providing weapons and other strategic aid to sympathetic factions while eliminating the opposing factions by incarceration or killing. If this “selection story” depicts the formation of alliances more accurately, then the argument of this chapter would receive support.

I have laid out a theory of ethnic cleansing that has implications for the way in which minority and majority ethnic groups interact. During times of peace, the argument predicts the existence of notable non-ethnic cleavages that cut across ethnic ones as well as cooperation across ethnic cleavages. This type of interaction ceases to exist and majority politicians switch to ethnic cleansing when an outside state tries to annex the territory of the state and forms an alliance with an ethnic minority in the process. The theory also has implications for the formation of the alliances between outside states and minority ethnic groups: the policies of the outside states should play a major role in this
process. The case studies below provide a qualitative test of the theory by focusing on the evolution of the historical processes that relate to these implications.

**Czechoslovakia: From the Switzerland of the East to Ethnic Cleansing**

The Czechoslovak Republic was officially recognized in 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference. It had a highly ethnically heterogeneous population, with about 48 percent Czechs, 23 percent Germans, 16 percent Slovaks and smaller numbers of Ukrainians, Hungarians, and Poles. In addition to being the second largest group, the Germans constituted one-third of the population of Bohemia, the most economically developed region in Czechoslovakia. Most of the German population lived in a strip of territory on the Czechoslovak-German border, called the Sudetenland, where they formed the majority of the population. Smaller numbers of Germans also lived in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine.

The initial takeover of German areas by Czech forces was relatively smooth, without much resistance from the German population. However, there were several instances in which the Germans expressed their disappointment in being included in the Czechoslovak Republic. For example, the German leadership organized a demonstration in March 1919, during which the Czech police forces panicked and opened fire on the demonstrators. There were also more symbolic acts of protest. German deputies in the newly elected Czech Parliament initially refused to participate in parliamentary proceedings and issued a declaration proclaiming that they would not recognize the Czechoslovak state’s right to Sudetenland.

Despite these early signs of protest, German opinion was from the beginning very much divided on the question of which country they should be located in. Many favored
incorporation into Austria, which was not unexpected, as they had previously been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Small but significant factions preferred incorporation into Germany or Czechoslovakia. One group that favored incorporation into Czechoslovakia was the industrialists, who thought that they would be at an advantage within Czechoslovakia rather than within Germany, where they would face substantial competition from indigenous firms.

From the early 1920s, the German leadership showed two important characteristics. First, it was divided among several political parties that fit on a typical left-right spectrum. The dominant party on the left was the German Social Democratic Party, which proved to be the largest German Party in the 1925 and 1929 elections. The major center-right parties included the German Christian Democrats and German Agrarians. The parties on the left and right were truly at odds with each other, especially on issues that related to socioeconomic policies. In the words of an expert at the time, “the most striking thing about the Sudeten Germans, politically, was the number of parties into which they had redivided, and the squabbles between these groups.”

Second, all major German parties, regardless of their ideological orientation, decided to take the “activist” path. In other words, they declared loyalty to the Czechoslovak State and displayed a willingness to collaborate with the Czech parties that shared their ideological orientations. The combined vote of these parties, which included the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and the Agrarians, was about 70 percent of the German vote in Czechoslovakia until the 1935 elections. The only exceptions to this trend were the German Nationalist Party and the German National Socialists (DNSAP). These were the only parties which stuck to an irrendentist agenda and denied loyalty to
the Czechoslovak State; their vote share among the Germans was considerably smaller than the “activist” parties.

The Czechs for their part also had a number of political parties located on the left-right spectrum. The Agrarian Party was the largest party on the right, and the Social Democratic Party dominated on the left. Notably, there was substantial cooperation between the German and Czech parties with similar socioeconomic agendas. The center-right parties, the German Agrarians, Czech Agrarians, and German Christian Democrats, formed a coalition in 1925 as a reaction to the increasingly “strong performance of communists.” In 1929, this right-wing coalition was replaced by a coalition of Czech and German Social Democratic parties.

The Czechoslovak policies toward the Germans were quite liberal under both right-wing and left-wing governments. In fact, one could argue that they not only fulfilled the requirements of the minority treaties but also at times went beyond them. For example, during World War I, a good number of Sudenten Germans had bought war bonds from Germany, but at the end of the war Germany was unable to fulfill these loans. This situation left many Czechoslovak Germans under economic distress; hence the Czechoslovak state fulfilled these loans, albeit at a reduced rate. On more conventional issues such as education, the Czechoslovaks treated Germans fairly. Germans enjoyed a system of public and private schools that taught in German as well as a German university. In fact, the number of schools per student in the German areas of Czechoslovakia exceeded the number of schools per student in Prussia at the time. The area where the Germans clearly lost was their share in the bureaucracy. The decline in the
number of Germans in public service was mostly due to the new requirement that all civil servants should be able to speak Czech.

All in all, in the 1920s and mid-1930s, neither the Czech nor the German populations displayed a radical, organic form of nationalism. Both groups were divided between right- and left-leaning factions, which regularly cooperated with their ideological counterparts in the other group, and the German parties that favored irredentism were confined to the margins of politics. In fact, to an observer in the early 1930s, Eduard Benes’s depiction of Czechoslovakia as “the Switzerland of the East” was not a far-fetched analogy. Yet an observer looking back from the 1950s would find the analogy rather ill-fitting, for in less than a decade the Sudeten Germans had turned almost uniformly pro-Third Reich, collaborated with the occupying German forces, and were deported to Germany. How did the German leaders in Czechoslovakia shift towards Nazi Germany within a couple of years? How did the Czech leaders, who had adopted quite liberal policies toward the Germans throughout the 1920s and 1930s, decide to deport them from their territory?

Economic factors undoubtedly played a role. An important aspect of the Czechoslovak economic structure was that the Germans tended to dominate in the export-oriented light industries, whereas the Czechs dominated in heavy industry geared toward domestic consumption. The Great Depression and tightening international trade restrictions therefore took a higher toll on the German industries than the Czech ones. In the immediate aftermath of the Great Depression, rates of unemployment were higher in German areas than in Czech areas, and economic recovery arrived more quickly in the Czech regions due to an increase in the demand for military equipment. The government
introduced social insurance measures to alleviate the effects of the Depression in Czech as well as German areas. In fact, the Germans received more than their national share of the benefits that the government provided to the unemployed. But high unemployment rates still urged some Germans to look beyond the mainstream parties.¹⁰

Yet the Sudeten German shift toward a more nationalist and pro-German attitude cannot be attributed to just domestic economic factors, as this trend continued and accelerated even after the German areas of Czechoslovakia recovered economically. The key driving force for the German population’s shift toward a radical platform was intervention from Germany. Organizations that aimed at preserving the identity of Germans in central Europe existed long before Hitler’s accession to power. Their main function was to ensure that the Germans located in central Europe remained culturally distinct, which in the future could help justify Germany’s claim to these territories. Among these, the main organization was the VDA (Society for Germandom Abroad), an association that professed to have cultural rather than political goals and busied itself with founding cultural societies in Czechoslovakia as well as elsewhere. After the Nazis came to power, they increased the funding for the VDA and created other organizations with more aggressive platforms such as the VoMi (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle).¹¹ Germany also influenced the German minority in Czechoslovakia by channeling funds through its consulates in various cities of Czechoslovakia. Intervention from Germany led to two notable changes in the structure of the German minority and its leadership. The first was a general shift away from political parties that concentrated on socioeconomic issues to parties with a nationalist platform; the second was an internal shift within the
nationalist party from a moderately nationalist, autonomy-seeking platform to a radical, irredentist platform.

Reflecting these two changes, three important events shaped the future of German politics within Czechoslovakia. First, the German Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia disbanded itself in autumn of 1933, around the same time the German Nationalist Party was banned by the Czechoslovak government. Second, a new German party with a nationalist platform, the Sudeten Home Front (SHF), later named the Sudeten German Party (SdP), was formed in October 1933 under the leadership of Konrad Henlein. Third, the Nazi regime in Germany, which took over in 1933, decided to put its weight behind this new party, as opposed to other German parties. Through organizations such as the VDA and the German consulates in Czechoslovakia, the SHF was given substantial financial assistance on several occasions. For example, before the 1935 elections the SHF received a large amount of financial assistance from the German Foreign Ministry.12

The assistance from Berlin also took more indirect forms. The German cultural associations that received financial aid from Berlin were encouraged to unite under an umbrella organization and were instructed to follow the SHF. These interventions from Germany bore fruit in the 1935 elections when the SHF, now renamed SdP, received 63.17 percent of the German votes in Bohemia and 56.12 percent of the German votes in Moravia and Silesia.13

Why was the German turn from a moderate to a nationalist platform so sudden? The answer is that despite the shift to the SdP in 1935, the change in German public opinion was not so sudden after all. In fact, it is unlikely that when the Sudeten Germans voted for the SdP in 1935, they were actually voting for a radical, irredentist platform.
Many non-German observers of the SHF-SdP did not consider it a radical and dangerous threat to the state. Among these was the party with the largest vote share in Czechoslovakia, the center-right Czech Agrarian Party. The Agrarians considered the socialist and communist movements within the German community as more dangerous than the nationalist platform of the SHF, and provided financial and political assistance to the SHF on several critical occasions. In 1933 and 1934, Henlein met with one of the prominent leaders of the Czech Agrarian Party, Viktor Stoupal, and received large amounts of money to help the SHF overcome the left-leaning German Parties in the elections. In addition, when the cabinet was considering whether to dissolve the SHF, the Agrarians strongly objected to such a policy. The decision was eventually left to the President of Czechoslovakia, Jan Masaryk, who decided to let the SHF participate in the elections. The SHF-SdP also had other unlikely allies. For example, Henlein traveled to Britain several times and was considered by the British to be a sensible politician who could be an important counterweight to “the communist threat” in Czechoslovakia.

Furthermore, it is questionable whether the leadership of the SHF-SdP was initially planning to turn into a pro-Nazi party. From before the 1935 elections to 1937, Henlein professed loyalty to the Czechoslovak State and followed a cooperative line toward the Czech Parties. In 1934, the SHF issued a decision to fight against fascism, including fascism in the form of National Socialism. In October 1934, Henlein gave a speech in front of 20,000 spectators, proclaiming his loyalty to democracy and the Czechoslovak Republic and condemning pan-Germanism as well as pan-Slavism. Henlein also went a step further and entered into negotiations with the Czech Agrarians on a potential election coalition, but the two parties failed to reach an agreement.
One can dismiss the importance of these acts by arguing that they were mere tactics designed to calm the Czech leadership rather than actions that reflected the true intentions of the SHF leader. It is important to note, however, that Henlein’s conciliatory attitude toward the Czechs was controversial within his own party and within the German nationalist leadership in general. As a matter of fact, he was heavily criticized by the more radical members of the SHF as well as by the National Socialists in Czechoslovakia for his willingness to cooperate with the Czech government.

The second important change in the leadership of the German minority in Czechoslovakia was the shift within the SHF-SdP toward a radical and pro-Reich nationalism. The core of the SHF leadership came from an organization called the Kameradschaftsbund (KB), formed by a small number of young Germans after the independence of Czechoslovakia. The KB was an exclusionary organization whose membership did not exceed 200-500 persons, but it provided the leadership cadre of the SHF, including important figures such as Walter Brand and Heinz Rutha. Most of these individuals had studied in Austria under Othmar Spann, who espoused an elitist, conservative, and anti-Marxist ideology, and they considered themselves Spann’s disciples. While not one of the leading members, Henlein also had strong ties with the KB.

The KB and the leadership of the SHF-SdP initially differed in important respects from the adamantly anti-Czechoslovak political parties, the National Socialists and German Nationalists. The KB members were traditionalist and pro-Church, and, more importantly, they were “interested in the unity of the Sudeten Germans within the context of the Czechoslovak State.” The National Socialists, by contrast, were anti-Church and
favored unification with Germany from the beginning. In the words of a German minister in Prague, “the National Socialists looked to Germany, whereas the KB wanted to create a Sudeten German man analogous to an Austrian.” Geographically, the strengths of the National Socialists and the KB lay in different regions. The KB had its stronghold in Northern Bohemia, where the professional German classes had close ties with Prague, whereas the National Socialists were stronger in western parts of Bohemia, particularly in the city of Asch, which had close ties with Germany.

The differences between the KB and the National Socialists were not lost on the Nazi regime. In a meeting in December 1933 held to determine how funds should be channeled to the members of the defunct German National Socialists, they decided that KB must be “ruled out in advance as unreliable” and should not receive subsidies from the Reich. Funds from Germany must have been quite important, because Konrad Henlein and Walter Brand travelled to Berlin, met with the director of the VDA, and convinced him to provide funds to the SHF-SdP. Meanwhile, the Berlin government started to consider SHF-SdP useful because its relatively moderate line made it more palatable for the Sudeten Germans and the Czechoslovak government.

Moreover, after the dissolution of the German National Party and the German National Socialists, some members of these parties joined the SHF-SdP. As a result, two factions, one KB and the other National Socialist, emerged within the SHF-SdP. These factions had important disagreements. For example, it was the KB-oriented members of the SHF-SdP who drafted the conciliatory speech that Henlein gave in 1934, a speech heavily criticized by the leaders with a National Socialist background as well as by the more radical members of SHF-SdP such as K. B. Frank. The KB and National Socialist
factions came into conflict on several other occasions. In the beginning, the KB side of the party, backed by Henlein, seemed to have the upper hand in these conflicts. This must have worried the Reich officials about the true nature of Henlein’s aims, as they demanded a declaration of solidarity with Germany. Henlein complied on June 21 in the Nazi stronghold of Asch, declaring, “it is essential that Prague should create a new, decent relationship to the entire German race, particularly to the German Reich…I prefer to be hated in the company of Germany than to draw advantages out of hatred of Germany.”

The friction within the SdP continued until the end of 1937. By then, the political context was completely different. Within Germany itself, former allies of the KB leaders had lost their positions, and the VDA was replaced by VoMi under the leadership of Heinrich Himmler. In March 1938, the situation changed even further when Germany invaded Austria and declared the Anschluss. After these developments, the KB leaders and Henlein expressed their allegiance to National Socialism increasingly more vocally. Both opportunism and fear seems have played a role in this shift. The invasion of Austria made it clear that Hitler would soon move on Sudeten Germany and those who wanted a career under the new regime were well-advised to follow a pro-Nazi line. At the same time, the mentor to many KB members, Othmar Spann, and his son were taken to a concentration camp after the invasion of Austria. Their harsh treatment signaled to the KB leaders the potential harm that might come from not fully complying with the Berlin line. The former KB members were not alone in these assessments. After the Anschluss, several formerly “activist” conservative political parties such as the German Agrarians and German Christian Democrats disbanded their party and joined the SdP.
In sum, after the independence of Czechoslovakia, the Germans had highly diverse political leanings and organizations, most of which did not adhere to an extreme nationalist platform that favored unification with Germany. Even among nationalist Germans there was an important distinction between those that were for unification with Germany and those that sought to achieve complete autonomy within the Czechoslovak state. The intervention from Berlin—especially in the form of financial aid—fundamentally changed the structure of the German leadership by gradually unifying it on a radical platform that was ready to act as the ally of Germany within Czechoslovakia.

The Czech response to the growing radicalization of the German community was for a long time highly restrained. On the one hand, parties that adamantly refused to cooperate with the system, such as the National Socialists and German National Party, were banned after the Nazi accession to power in Germany. On the other hand, Czech politicians tried to turn the tide of German nationalism by letting the SdP function as a legitimate political party. Czech politicians also tried to appease the Germans in other ways. For example, in 1936 the Czechoslovak President Eduard Benes toured the German areas of Bohemia, attending cultural events such as the opening of a German theater and giving conciliatory speeches. In 1937, the Czech government also accepted a program outlined by the “activist” German parties, which expanded Germans’ rights within Czechoslovakia by increasing their representation in the public sector and securing government contracts for German-owned companies. However, the SdP rejected the plan.28

In 1938, the relations between the SdP and the Czech government grew tenser. By then, Henlein was aware of the impending German invasion and was instructed from
Germany to demand more until the Czech side could not accept the proposed reforms. Unable to reach an agreement with the SdP and faced with a German revolt, on September 13 the Czech army took control of the Sudetenland and declared martial law. In the aftermath of the takeover, the leading figures of the SdP, including Henlein, escaped to Germany, and the rest of the SdP members defected to a compromising position with the Czech government. These developments, however, were rendered insignificant with Germany’s invasion of the Sudetenland in November 1938 and then the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

The occupation of Czechoslovakia fundamentally changed the relationship between the Czechs and Germans and the Czech leadership’s approach to the German problem. From the beginning, the members of the German minority in Czechoslovakia were visibly involved in the occupation regime. A prominent SdP leader with close ties to Himmler, K. B. Frank, was chosen to be the State Secretary of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The Sudeten Germans also played an important role in the lower echelons of the occupation administration. For example, the commissars running the cities were mostly Sudeten Germans.

Among Frank’s first actions were closing down Czech universities, theaters, and most Czech publications. After mass demonstrations in the summer of 1939, about 8,000 public figures were arrested. In response to student protests that took place in November 1939, nine leading student activists were shot and about 1,200 students were sent to concentration camps. Reinhard Heydrich’s appointment as the Reich Commissar to Bohemia and Moravia further increased the level of repression. The Czech Prime Minister and five other leading figures were killed in September 1941 and the number of
executions and deportations to concentration camps increased. An important turning point was the assassination of Heydrich on May 27, 1942, carried out by parachutists who were sent from Britain. In a response that came to symbolize the brutality of the occupation for the Czechs, the Germans carried out 1,148 arrests, 657 summary executions, and razed a village called Lidice, killing all of its male inhabitants.

The policies of the German occupiers and Sudeten Germans’ visible connection to them had a profound impact on the Czech leadership. After the occupation, two groups of Czechoslovak leaders emerged. One was the resistance movement within Czechoslovakia known as “the Central Committee of Home Resistance” (UVOD), dominated mostly by Social Democrats. The other was the government-in-exile in Britain, led by Eduard Benes, the Czechoslovak President at the time of the German invasion. Given that the experience of the UVOD members with the German occupation was more direct, it is not surprising that they were the first ones to advocate a complete deportation of the German population once the occupation was over. As early as 1940, UVOD incorporated the idea of the transfer of Sudeten Germans in its program. In September 1941, the UVOD newspaper declared, “the third republic will be a national state—it cannot tolerate any more the old conception of the minority policy.”

The leaders of the government-in-exile changed their opinions more slowly, but they also eventually converged on the deportation of the Germans. For example, in the winter of 1940-1941, they discussed several potential solutions for the German minority problem in Czechoslovakia. Among the proposals considered were the transfer of Czechs to German regions; the cession of some German territories, such as Asch and its surrounding area, to Germany; the forced assimilation of Germans; the deportation of
Germans to Germany; and combinations of these policies. By the end of 1941, however, there was general agreement that any plan at the end of the war would involve a comprehensive deportation of Germans. In September 1941, Benes declared that he “accepted the principle of the transfer of populations,” in January 1942, he argued that “it will be necessary to rid our country of all German bourgeoisie, the pan-German intelligentsia, and the workers who have gone over to fascism.”

The gradual radicalization of the Czech opinion in exile can also be observed in their interactions with the Sudeten Germans, mainly German Social Democrats, who had also escaped the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia. Between 1940 and 1942, the leader of the German Social Democrats, Wenzel Jaksch, and Eduard Benes met at least four times. At the first meeting in August 1939, Jaksch offered to join the liberation movement in return for guarantees for a federal Czechoslovakia after the war, and Benes rejected the offer. The negotiations in July 1940 had more positive results: Jaksch declared solidarity with Benes, and Benes responded by inviting the German Social Democrats to join the State Council. By the end of 1941, however, Benes had to adjust this decision. At a meeting in September he told Jaksch that they would need to postpone the joining of the Germans in the State Council because of the rising levels of repression in Czechoslovakia. Finally, by January 1942, cooperation with German Social Democrats was completely out of the question. In their last meeting, Benes told Jaksch that the events in Czechoslovakia and the demands of the underground movement made it impossible for the Germans to participate in any liberation movement.

Given the gradual radicalization of the Czech leadership throughout the war, it was not surprising that once the German armies pulled out, the Czech leaders proceeded
to implement ethnic cleansing against the Czechoslovak Germans. The deportation of the German population of Czechoslovakia took place in two episodes. The first episode started immediately after the Soviet forces entered Czechoslovakia and lasted until the Potsdam Conference in August 1945, which sanctioned the orderly transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia as well as from Poland and Hungary. The deportations in this period were sporadic and carried out by the members of the Czech resistance with the aid of the Red Army. The second episode started after the Potsdam Conference and lasted until the end of 1947. During this period, orderly convoys of Czechoslovak Germans were organized and sent to Soviet- or U.S.-occupied German territory. By the end of 1947, a total of 3,200,000 Germans had been forced to leave Czechoslovakia, leaving Bohemia with virtually no Germans.34

The Ottoman State: From Multinational Empire to Ethnic Cleansing

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire lived in several areas. The largest concentrations were in the capital city of Istanbul, where 300,000_400,000 Greeks lived; the western regions of Anatolia, including the city of Izmir, where 300,000_500000 Greeks lived; and Thrace and Macedonia, where about 600,000 Greeks lived.35 There were also significant Greek populations in the province of Trabzon in Northeastern Anatolia, in Central Anatolia, and in the area around the city of Bursa. In total, the Greeks constituted about 14 percent of the Ottoman population in the early twentieth century.

The main factor that historically held the Greek community together was the practice of Orthodox Christianity and its place in the Ottoman system. As part of the
millet system, the Greek Orthodox Church had extensive privileges, which basically allowed it to organize the internal affairs of the Orthodox population. These privileges included a court system responsible for resolving intra-communal disputes, authority over the education of the Orthodox population of the Empire, and the right to collect taxes from this group. Historically, the entire Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire, including Bulgarian and Serbian speakers, had been under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Patriarch. By the 1900s, however, the picture had changed; the Serbs had gained their independence and, to curb the power of the Orthodox Patriarch in the face of territorial demands from the Greek state, the Ottomans had allowed the Bulgarians to form their own Exarchist Church with similar rights to the Orthodox Patriarchy. Hence, by the beginning of twentieth century, the overlap between the Greek national identity and membership in the Orthodox Patriarchy was tighter than it had ever been.

The Ottoman Greeks had historically played an important role in both the Ottoman administration and the economy. Immediately after Greek independence in 1821, there was a certain decline in Greek predominance in the Ottoman administration. But in the 1850s, the Greeks still had highly significant positions in the Ottoman administration, especially in the diplomatic corps, and represented the Ottoman Empire against foreign countries, including Greece. Economically, the Greeks were the most active segment of the Ottoman middle class; they dominated sectors such as shipping, mining, commercial agriculture, and banking. They played a substantial role in the economy of the wealthiest regions of the empire, such as the Aydin Province and Istanbul.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans made a halfhearted attempt to “Ottomanize” the Greek population along with the other minorities of the empire. The first steps in this direction were taken with the declaration of the Edict of Tanzimat in 1839 and the Gulhane Hatti Humayun in 1856. Both documents declared the Greeks and other Christian communities to be equal citizens of the empire and extended them the right to serve in the army. The latter policy was potentially important because the Christian population had been previously excluded from serving in the army and had been forced to pay an additional tax instead. In the following years, other laws were passed, including ones extending state control over education and controlling brigandage in the countryside. However, most of these reforms remained on paper, and the communal structure of the Ottoman society survived more or less intact until the twentieth century.

Demographic changes in the empire also reflected the Ottoman attitude toward the Greeks at the time. During the period between 1831 and 1881, the Greek population grew by 2 percent a year, whereas during the same period the Muslim population remained roughly the same. The growth in the Greek population was especially significant in the Western regions, particularly in the Aydin Province. For example, in the city of Izmir, the Greek population grew from 20,000 in 1830 to 200,000 in 1910. What is noteworthy is that in addition to the natural population increase, the rise in the Greek population resulted from emigration from mainland Greece. Remarkably, the Ottoman Empire encouraged such immigration to attract occupants for unused land in Western Anatolia. Hence, if the demographic policies of the empire are a guide, in the second
half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire did not consider the existence of a substantial Greek population on its territory to be a problem.

With the exception of a short-lived experience with parliament in 1877–1878, the Ottoman State remained strictly authoritarian until 1908. There were, however, several groups that sought to introduce a parliamentary system and curb the powers of Sultan Abdulhamit. Some of these “Young Turks” were located in Western European capitals. This émigré group was divided between those who preferred a more centralized political system and those who envisioned an economically and politically decentralized one. A second part of the Young Turk movement was a group of young officers, who formed a secret organization—the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). In 1908, this organization started a rebellion in Macedonia, which the Sultan could not crush. In July of that year, Abdulhamit was forced to sanction elections for a new parliament.

As a result of the transition to a more democratic system, the fault lines in Ottoman politics became more visible. On one side was the CUP, which favored a centralized political system and sought to curtail the privileges of religious institutions, be they Muslim or Christian. The CUP’s view on the Christian minorities such as Greeks was an extension of its more general ideology: it wanted to achieve a system in which the minorities would enjoy equal rights with the Muslims and, in return, it expected the Christian minorities to adopt an Ottoman identity that would trump their communal identities.40

With the benefit of hindsight, such an expectation on the part of the CUP leaders appears naïve and doomed to failure. Yet in 1908, there was some euphoria among Turks and Christian minorities about the new political system and its promises. After all, Greek
and Bulgarian Christians had supported and welcomed the rebellion in Macedonia.\textsuperscript{41} There were also some signs that the new constitution might lead to a decrease in Greek and Bulgarian nationalist activity that had afflicted Macedonia in the last decade. For example, both the Bulgarian and Greek bands that were operating in Macedonia halted their activities after 1908.\textsuperscript{42} The optimism at the time is well-illustrated by the words of a Greek observer in Macedonia, Athanasios Souliotes, who played an important role in Ottoman Greek politics: “the fact that a promise that was not particularly sincere could cause people of different nations that used to look at each other with suspicion to fill the streets holding hands convinced me that nations with so much in common could always find ways to cooperate, join forces, and live in amity.”\textsuperscript{43}

The second faction in Ottoman politics was an odd coalition of liberals and the religious elite that assembled to counter the CUP. What bound these forces together was a dislike for the centralist paradigm espoused by the CUP and a preference for a more decentralized system allowing for religious and communal autonomy. By implication, this faction favored retaining the communal privileges of Christian minorities, rather than pursuing policies that sought to “Ottomanize” and secularize them along with their Muslim counterparts.

This faction formed two political parties. The first one, Ahrar Firkasi (Liberal Party) was formed in September 1908. This party, however, proved to be short-lived because it got involved in an attempted coup that was organized by a combination of religious officers and elite on April 13, 1909. The attempted coup was crushed by military units who arrived from the CUP stronghold of Macedonia and were sympathetic to this party. In the aftermath of the coup, the CUP used its regained strength to force the
Liberal Party to dissolve itself. The “liberal group,” most of whom were already in the parliament, formed yet another political party in 1911 named the Freedom and Unity Party (FU). The FU had some initial success in the intermediary elections of 1911, but its performance in the general elections of 1912 was mixed, not least due to CUP’s violent tactics during the elections.\textsuperscript{44} The FU’s importance, however, lay not in its electoral success but in the fact that there were a lot of individuals in the cabinet as well as in the parliament who were not officially members but were nevertheless sympathetic to its political agenda.\textsuperscript{45}

Both the CUP and the FU were willing to cooperate with minorities for ideological reasons and to increase their political support against each other. The FU was widely supported by several Muslim minority groups such as the Arabs and Albanians, and it also succeeded in acquiring the support of the Greek leadership. When the FU was being established in 1911, the members of the Greek Party in the Parliament (MPs), which included sixteen of the twenty-six Greek MPs, were actually invited to join the FU.\textsuperscript{46} The Greek parliamentarians did not want to officially join the FU, but they agreed to work closely with it against the CUP and to this effect they assigned two MPs who were responsible for regulating the relations between the Greek Party and the FU. The FU members, the members of the Greek Party, and representatives of other nationalities met regularly in order to coordinate their activities against the CUP.\textsuperscript{47} In addition to these regular meetings, there were election coalitions between the Liberal Party and the Patriarchate in 1908 and the FU and the Greek Party in 1912.\textsuperscript{48}

For its part, the CUP also made attempts to cooperate with the Greeks but, due to its centralizing tendencies, its relations with Greek leaders proved to be more difficult.
The first potential conflict arose right after the 1908 revolution, when the Greek Patriarch, fearful of CUP’s impact on the Patriarchy and the Greek community, asked the Ottoman Court (Sublime Porte) to guarantee the traditional millet privileges. In order to allay the Patriarch’s fears, the CUP sent a representative known for his liberal views to reiterate that the CUP did not intend to encroach on the Patriarchy’s privileges. The second problem emerged on the eve of the first parliamentary elections in 1908, when some of the Greek residents of the empire were not given the right to vote in the elections. Some of these people were actually foreign subjects; others had avoided registering as citizens because doing so would have obliged them to pay high taxes or serve in the army. On this occasion, the CUP decided to act as the intermediary between the Porte and the Patriarch and sent a delegation to the Patriarch composed of two Muslims and one Greek. In the negotiations, the Patriarch was offered representation in the parliament proportional to the share of Greeks in the population. Though the Patriarch initially responded positively to this offer, the conflict over voting rights and Greek representation in the parliament was not totally resolved.

The relations between the Greek leaders and the CUP got considerably worse after the Greek party allied itself first with the Liberal Union and then with the organizers of the coup attempt in April 1909. After the CUP regained power, it passed several resolutions that severely restricted the privileges of the Greek and other Christian communities. These resolutions included an educational reform that restricted communal rights, as well as the conscription of the Christians to the Ottoman army without the option of paying to get out of service. These laws, however, were quickly rescinded in 1911. Part of the reason for CUP’s change of heart was the formation of the FU and the
potential threat that it posed to CUP’s supremacy. To counter the FU threat, the CUP once again switched to a policy of conciliation with the Greek leaders. Prior to the elections in 1912, it sent a delegation to the Greek Patriarch and proposed to form an election coalition in return for several concessions, such as increasing the number of Greek MPs in the Parliament and giving the Minister of Justice position to a Greek politician. This offer, however, was declined by the Patriarch under pressure from the Greek Party in the Parliament, which preferred to enter an agreement with the FU. However, this decision was not unchallenged, and several Greek Parliamentarians preferred to enter the elections on the CUP list.

The Greek community of the Ottoman Empire had its own political factions that evolved over time. In the 1850s, there were two main blocs. One, promoted by the Patriarchy, civil servants, and wealthy merchants, favored the existing status quo within the Empire. Another, supported by middle-class professionals, looked to the Greek state for guidance. After the Greek defeat in the 1897 Greco-Turkish War, the attitude of the second faction started to change for two reasons. The first was the general disappointment in Greece’s performance in the 1897 war; the second was the growing competition between the Orthodox Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate in Macedonia. As a result of these factors, a new outlook, which sought to endorse “Hellenism” within a multinational Ottoman Empire rather than joining the Greek State, took precedence. This idea was promoted by two Greeks from mainland Greece, Ion Dragoumes, a diplomat, and Athanasios Souliotes. These two individuals also established the Society of Constantinople with support from the Foreign Ministry of Greece, which quickly gained a stronghold in the Greek population of Istanbul. The Society of
Constantinople was actively involved in the formation of the Greek Party in Parliament and continued affecting its policies throughout its existence. Initially, the relations between the Society of Constantinople and the Patriarchy were strained due to the secular nature of nationalism endorsed by the Society. However, the two institutions grew closer in the face of the CUP policies that challenged the political agenda of both groups, and they agreed on an election coalition with the FU.

In the early twentieth century, another Greek faction, who preferred to cooperate with the CUP rather than the FU, also emerged. The members of this faction believed that the best way to further Greek interests was to form an alliance with the CUP. As a result, ten out of the twenty-six Greek deputies in the Ottoman Parliament did not join the Greek Party. These deputies and several other Greek leaders also parted with the Greek Party’s common decision to enter an election coalition with the FU and, instead, entered the elections on the CUP list. After the elections, the number of Greek delegates in the Parliament was reduced to sixteen and most of these were on the CUP list. However, the success of the CUP supporters should not be taken as a strong indicator of the actual backing they enjoyed in the Greek community, because the CUP used extensive intimidation against the opposition parties in the 1912 elections. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that a substantial number of Greek deputies were ready to collaborate with a party that openly challenged the traditional privileges of the Greek community.

The policies of Greece had an important impact on the Ottoman Greek population in general and their leadership in particular. Organizations from mainland Greece were highly influential in developing a standardized identity that united the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire. The main tool for this type of influence was education. Starting in
the second half of the nineteenth century, individuals and organizations from mainland Greece established schools in Anatolia with curricula similar to that of schools in Greece. These schools, as well as other organizations such as literary societies, were also actively supported and formed by the Greek consulates that existed in various cities of the Ottoman Empire. Another important factor was the large number of Ottoman Greeks who went to mainland Greece for university education and then came back to the Ottoman Empire. These students typically received financial assistance from the University of Athens, various Greek banks, and Greece itself.

Another tool for promoting Greek identity was cross-border violence, specifically in Macedonia. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Greek and Bulgarian nationalists were in intense competition for the “identity” of the largely Slavic-speaking population of Macedonia. The main criterion used to define “Greekness” or “Bulgarianess” in this context was membership in the Orthodox Patriarchy or the Bulgarian Exarchist Church. In order to sway the population of Macedonia toward “Greekness”, the Greek State engaged in several policies. It aided the formation of bands by some Greek army officers who then crossed the border to Macedonia and organized the local population to counter similar formations by the Bulgarians. The activities of these bands, as well as the provision of arms, personnel, and espionage services, were organized by the Greek consular offices in major cities such as Monastir, Serres, Kavala, and Thessaloniki. This network of institutions used several tactics to convert the local population to “Greekness.” For example, they urged the population to boycott the shops of those individuals who adhered to the Exarchist church or they provided gifts and loans to those who willingly came back to the fold of the Patriarchy. When such “peaceful”
strategies did not work, they also used strategic killings, beatings, and damage to private property. The extensive campaign in Macedonia eventually succeeded in turning the tide of Bulgarian nationalism. But Greek-Bulgarian rivalry also divided Macedonia into “Bulgarian” and “Greek” areas and provided the setting for the mutual massacres and deportations that occurred during the Balkan Wars.

Greece also shaped the leadership and political alliances of the Ottoman Greek community. For example, prior to the elections in 1908, the Greek consular officials throughout the Ottoman Empire signaled their preferred candidates. In addition, the Greek Foreign Ministry was involved in the establishment of the Society of Constantinople, as well as the Greek Party in the Ottoman Parliament. Politicians from mainland Greece also used their resources to affect the decisions of the Greek delegates in the Parliament by signaling that those candidates who did not enter the 1912 elections on the Greek Party ticket would not enjoy the backing of organizations financed from Greece.

The Ottoman Empire faced two episodes of occupation by the Greek army. The first, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 resulted in the loss of all territory in Europe except for Eastern Thrace; the second, the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922, resulted in the crumbling of the Empire and its replacement with the Turkish State. In each instance, the links between local Greeks and the occupying armies transformed the Ottoman Turkish elite’s ideas about minorities. As already discussed, the fault lines between different communities in Macedonia had been drawn prior to 1912 due to the rivalry between Greece and Bulgaria. Once the war in the Balkans became imminent, the links that
Greece and Bulgaria had formed with local Macedonian leaders throughout the 1900s became relevant again.

Such links were used for two purposes. First, before the war, some Greek volunteers who had already done work in Macedonia before 1908 were sent back to organize the local population. A good number of the local leaders responded to the call of these volunteers. Second, these types of “unofficial” bands, which were formed not only by Greeks but also by Bulgarians and Turks, played a significant part during the war. They participated in the burning of villages and the killing of the civilian populations whom they considered to be on the “wrong” side of the war. Significantly, such activities were not the result of an age-old “ethnic hatred” that afflicted the populations of this area. They were a result of the fact that three states—the Ottomans on the defense, Greece and Bulgaria on the offense—had followed a conscious policy of dividing the population of Macedonia for decades in an effort to accord legitimacy to their territorial claims.

The Balkan Wars had a profound effect on the Young Turk movement, especially the members of the CUP. To appreciate this effect, one has to recall that the birthplace as well as the initial stronghold of the CUP was Macedonia. Hence, after the Balkan Wars, the CUP began a deep search for the causes of the defeat that had led to the loss of Macedonia as well as Western Thrace. As a result, the CUP leaders made two important changes to their prior policies. First, they completely suppressed the opposition and took over the government through a coup d’etat. In fact, the CUP coup happened as the Second Balkan War was ongoing, with the alleged reason that the current government, dominated by the opposition, could possibly cede the city of Edirne in Eastern Thrace to
Bulgaria. To stop the government from surrendering Edirne, two leading CUP members went to the parliament and forced the government to resign, shooting the Minister of War in the process. After this event, the main opposition party, the FU, dissolved itself, arguing that it did not wish to challenge the government during times of war.

The second important change to the CUP policy was that the party halted any efforts to collaborate with the Greek Party or the Patriarchy and adopted a policy of partial but forced deportation of Greeks in Thrace and the western regions of the Empire. This decision was guided by the emerging belief among the CUP leadership that “in order to end the trouble with the smaller Balkan states, they had to end the existence of populations that encouraged these states to seek territory from the Ottoman Empire.”

Members of the CUP also expected that after the Balkan Wars, the Greeks would push toward the Aydin Province on the Aegean coast. In case of such an event, the CUP wanted to avoid the repetition of the events in the Balkans. To implement its new policy, the CUP suggested an exchange agreement with the Greek government through which the Muslim population of Macedonia would be exchanged for the Greeks in the Aegean Islands, Aydin Province, and Eastern Thrace. The Greek government initially rejected this suggestion. But to force the hand of the Greek government, the CUP began to deport some Greeks in the western territories anyway, and the CUP turned a blind eye when Muslim refugees arriving from Macedonia and Western Thrace harassed Greeks on Ottoman territory. Eventually, the Greek government agreed to the exchange in 1914 but the beginning of the World War I interfered, and the agreement was not put into effect at the time. Nevertheless, in 1914, prior to World War I about 100,000 Greeks from Eastern Thrace and Western Anatolia were deported to Greece or inner Anatolia.
The second episode of Greek occupation started in May 1919, after the Ottoman defeat in World War I. The occupation was initially confined to the Izmir Sancak of Aydin Province, which was home to more Greeks than Muslims. But it soon extended to inner Anatolia as well as Eastern Thrace, where the majority of the population was Muslim. Soon after the invasion, several incidents increased the tension between the Turks and Greeks. In the first few days after the occupation of Izmir, several Turkish soldiers were apprehended and killed. In addition, the local Greek population, with the backing of the Greek Army, engaged in looting, beatings, and occasional killings of the local Muslim population. In other coastal towns, there were skirmishes between Turkish resistance groups and local Greek bands aiding the Greek Army.\(^{68}\) During some of these clashes, Greek forces deported the population of Turkish villages and then burned the houses.\(^{69}\) In Izmir and the surrounding area, such events halted after the appointment of Aristidis Stergiadis as the Governor of Izmir.\(^{70}\) Yet, similar events continued in Eastern Thrace, Bursa, and the area around Istanbul.\(^{71}\)

The most important result of the occupation of Anatolia and the helplessness of the Istanbul regime against it was the emergence of a new leadership under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal. The goal of this leadership was to unite the various resistance movements in Anatolia and fight back against the occupying Greek, French, and Italian armies from a base in Ankara. The leaders of the movement were not entirely new to Ottoman politics; many of the leading figures, including Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Inonu, had been members of the Young Turk movement. What distinguished them from the previous leadership was that before 1919 they had not been involved in the political decision-making processes; instead, most of them had served as officers in the Ottoman
Army. Since these individuals were not directly involved in politics prior to the occupation of Anatolia, it is difficult to correctly identify what policies they would have preferred on issues involving the Greek minority prior to 1919.

However, by 1922 the Ankara leadership, now quickly gaining ground against the Greek armies, sought to expel the Greek minority from the entire territory of Anatolia. As early as March 1922, the Ankara government told the British government that they were ready for an exchange of populations between the Greeks of Asia Minor and the Muslims of Greece.72 The limits of the proposal were further clarified when, in October 1922, the envoy of the Ankara Government met with Fridtjof Nansen and reiterated that “the Ankara Government only permitted him to negotiate total and enforced exchange of populations.”73 This policy was put into effect after the Turkish army won the war. In the regained areas, the Greek population was given a matter of weeks to leave, and young, able-bodied men were recruited for labor battalions; those that survived were then sent to Greece.74 Apart from the forced expulsions, large numbers of Greeks fled in anticipation of the approaching Turkish Army. Hence, by the opening of the Lausanne Conference in November 1922, which eventually stabilized the borders between Greece and Turkey, Greece had already received a large number of refugees from Anatolia.

An exchange agreement regarding the Greeks of Anatolia and the Muslims of Greece was one of the hotly debated issues in the Lausanne Conference. The Greek side favored an agreement that would leave the Orthodox Patriarchy, along with the Greek population of Istanbul, in Istanbul. The Turkish side favored a complete deportation of all the Greeks of Anatolia, including the Istanbul Greeks. Eventually, the Turkish side reluctantly agreed that the Istanbul Patriarchy and the Greeks of Istanbul would stay in
Turkey in return for leaving the Muslims in Western Thrace in Greece. In the end, the Muslim population of Greece, except for those in Western Thrace, was exchanged for the entire Orthodox population of Anatolia, except for those in Istanbul.

**Conclusion**

This study started with the question of whether and how the depth of ethnic cleavages plays a role in the process that leads to ethnic cleansing. I argued that deep ethnic cleavages do not play a significant role in this process, as it is primarily the conflicts between states that cause interethnic relations to deteriorate prior to episodes of ethnic cleansing.

Broadly, the theory has three observable implications. First, in times of peace, both majority and minority groups are divided along political cleavages other than ethnicity. Second, during periods of peace, different ethnic groups cooperate along non-ethnic cleavages; this cooperation ceases to be an option once outside states form alliances with minority groups during times of war or occupation. Third, when faced with expansionist threats by states allied with minority groups, majority politicians that are friendly to such minorities either become hostile to such minorities or are replaced by more radical leaders.

The two cases examined here generally fit the expectations of the theory. Throughout the interwar period, the Czech politicians on both the left and the right consistently cooperated with their German counterparts and provided the German community with extensive rights. Only after the German invasion and collaboration between local Germans and the occupiers did these politicians converge on forced deportation as a way to deal with the German minority. Similarly, the two major factions
of the Young Turks (the Liberals and the CUP) tried to lure the Greeks to their fold and did not seriously consider using ethnic cleansing until after the Balkan Wars. Finally, the switch to forced expulsions came as a result of the two episodes of Greek invasions, first during the Balkan Wars and then after World War I, during which the potential of cooperation across ethnic groups disappeared as an option.

This study also focuses on the question of how minority groups form alliances with outside states. This question is theoretically important because it addresses the possible claim that the depth of ethnic cleavages determine whether or not minority groups ally with outside states. This chapter suggests two conclusions. First, the idea that deep ethnic cleavages on their own can push the minority to form an alliance with an outside state is empirically wrong. Minority groups such as the Germans in interwar Czechoslovakia and the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire were among those with the deepest differences from the majorities in the countries of their residence. The Sudeten Germans had been members of the dominant ethnic group within the Austrian Empire and had enjoyed access to all levels of education in German, as well as a host of other political and cultural organizations. The Greeks in the Ottoman Empire were officially defined as part of the Orthodox millet, which was legally separate from the Muslim majority and enjoyed several privileges.

Yet even in these contexts, the minority leadership was split between those who favored collaboration with the outside state and those who did not. What made the difference was intervention from Germany and Greece, which shaped the leadership of the minorities so that they became more open to forming an alliance with these countries. In Czechoslovakia, financial and organizational aid from the Reich gradually shifted the
power from political parties which had a non-nationalist platform to the nationalist SHF-SdP. Policies of Greece played an important role in the organization of the Greek Party in the Ottoman Parliament, as well as in the generation of a network of organizations, especially in Macedonia, that could be mobilized in case of a war. Thus, even in these cases of deep ethnic cleavage, alliance formation with the minority required a good deal of work on the part of the expansionist state.

This chapter makes several important observations. First, during peacetime, ethnic groups have significant internal divisions, and they cooperate with the members of other ethnic groups against their co-ethnics. Second, ethnic cleavages trump other political divisions, and relations between ethnic groups deteriorate as a result of alliances between minority ethnic groups and territory-seeking states. Third, outside states initiate and sustain the formation of alliances by strengthening the factions within the minority ethnic groups who are open to alliance formation. More systematic analysis, including statistical tests and detailed studies of other cases, is needed to establish these points more conclusively.\(^\text{75}\) However, the analysis here strongly suggests that focusing on interstate competition is a better way of explaining ethnic cleansing than focusing on age-old ethnic differences and their assumed impact on interethnic relations.
The depth of ethnic cleavages refers to the political significance of the differences between ethnic groups in a given context. This significance is determined by a combination of the cultural characteristics of the groups (such as whether or not they speak similar languages or whether or not they practice the same religion) and the historical experience that filters these cultural characteristics (such as whether or not the minority group has had access to a separate education system or an autonomous religious organization).


3 At the individual level, multiple motivations, including “resentment” and “fear,” might lead to this shift in the priorities and opinions of the majority leaders. Hence the argument here is not incompatible with the literature that argues that these motivations lead to mass ethnic violence. On “resentment,” see Roger Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence. Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in 20th Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); on “fear,” or as more commonly known, “security dilemma,” see Russell Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993): pp. 27-47. This paper, however, is different in that it provides a theory of the process that paves the way to these motivations.


5 In the context of interwar Czechoslovakia, the term “activist” referred to parties that were open to cooperation with the Czechoslovak State. I also use this word to refer to these parties.


8 Ibid, p. 41.

9 Also see Erin K. Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007), on this question. The analysis below diverges from Jenne’s work in that it focuses on the political cleavages within the Czech as well as the German community in interwar Czechoslovakia and, given that it is primarily interested in ethnic cleansing rather than ethnic bargaining, it pays specific attention to the formation of the war-time alliance between the German minority in Czechoslovakia and Germany and the impact of this alliance on the decision to deport the Germans after the war.

10 Ibid, p. 17.


12 Ibid, p. 74.


18 Haag, “Knights of the Spirit.”

19 Robbins, “Konrad Henlein.”


21 Ibid, pp. 61, 62.

22 Ibid, pp. 62-64.


25 Ibid., p. 684.

26 Ibid., p. 685.
28 Luza, The Transfer, pp.96, 97.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 220.
31 Ibid., pp. 220, 221.
32 Ibid., p. 233.
38 Ibid., pp. 20, 21.
39 Ibid., p. 23.
44 This election is known as the “big stick” election in Ottoman History.
45 Kemal Pasa, who was sympathetic to the Liberals, twice served as the prime minister.
46 Ali Birinci, Hürriyet ve İtilaf jırkısı : Il Mesutiyet Devrinde İtilat ve Terraki’ye Karşı Cıkanlar (Istanbul, Turkey: Dergah Yayınları, 1990). The “Greek Party” was not an official political party, but a parliamentary group of Greek deputies.
48 Feroz Ahmad, “Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914,” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the Functioning of a Plural Society (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982).
50 Ibid, p. 408.
52 Alexandris, The Greek Minority.
55 Boura, “The Greek Millet.”
60 Ibid., p. 206.
61 Clogg, “A Millet.”
62 Boura, “The Greek Millet.”
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
68 Bilge Umar, *Yunanlıların ve Anadolu Rumlarının anlatımıyla Ezmir savaş.* (Istanbul, Turkey: İnkılap, 2002.)
71 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 61.
74 Ibid., p. 61; Onur Yildirim, *Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek Exchange of Populations* (New York: Routledge, 2006).
75 The author undertakes this task in her book manuscript, *Territorial Conflict and Ethnic Cleansing: Europe and Beyond*. 